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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

"\VALTER ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.ARTHUR HARD:MAN, dba HARD~ifAN
AUTO SALES, NATHAN CHILD and
BARRUS :MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
8580

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the
record. The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in the trial court.)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal by the defendant Hardman from a
judgment rendered against him and one Child in favor
of Walter Anderson in the sum of $5,632.00. The case
arose out of a head-on collision between two cars on the
Saltair Highway .approximately 8 miles west of Salt
Lake City, Utah, on December 20, 1954. This case is one
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of five brought by the five individuals who were in a west
bound automobile driven by George Williams,
An east bound pick up truck driven by defendant
Nathan Child was on the wrong side of the road and
collided with the west bound automobile. The plaintiffs
in these cases have contended that Child was either the
agent or servant of Hardman or that Hardman and Child
were engaged in a joint enterprise and hence the negligence of Child should be imputed to Hardman and he
thereby became liable for any damages suffered. All five
cases have been tried and the following verdicts have
been obtained : Walter Anderson $4,632.00 ; Administrator of C. Tennyson Johnson, $43,628.23; George Williams, $78,055.00; Administratrix of George Smith,
$30,725.32; Elwin V. 1\Iillward, $8,197.79. The first three
of these cases are now in various stages of appeal and the
last two cases are before the District Court on Motions
subsequent to verdict.
STATEl\1:ENT OF FACTS
\V e do not believe the statement of facts contained in
the Brief of Appellant is adequate in that it does not present a complete picture of the testimony as developed
at the trial.

Defendant Hardman operated a used car lot at Sunset, Utah (91). Defendant Child was in the market for
a pick up trurk and defendant Hardinan had located one
in Tooele which he thought n1ight be acceptable to Child
(92). On the 1norning of December 20, 1955, Hardman
and Child left Sunset, lTtah, for Tooele, lTtah, for the
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purpose of examining this pickup truck (79). They left
in a wrecker truck owned by Hardman and .apparently
employed by him in his used car and garage business ( 79).
Upon arrival at Tooele and the Barrus ~1otor Company, the pickup truck was examined and Child indicated
that it was acceptable to him (84). When questioned
about the price, Child testified (80) :

"Q.

The price had not been agreed upon while you
were in Tooele, had it~

Mr. Hanson: Just a moment, which price do you
mean~

Mr. Roberts: The price he was going to pay for
it.
Mr. Hanson: You mean withMr. Roberts: That Mr. Child was going to pay to
Mr. Hardman.
Mr. Hanson: All right.
A.

Well, it was partly agreed upon; yes, sir.

Q.

Had it been actually agreed upon~

A.

Well, not that I remember."

On cross examination of Child by Hardman's attorney, he testified as follows (85, 86-87) :

"Q.

Now, when-you expected, ,as soon as you got
home, you would pay him $500 cash that you
had at home ; didn't you~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the balance of 150 would be payable in
ninety days, so that he would give you credit
for it; isn't that right~
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A. I don't remember that.

Q. You sure about that~
A. I don't remember that; it could have been.

Q. Let's see if you could. Now, do you remember of telling your attorneys in substanceand I wouldn't expect you to recall the exact
words-the following: 'The International had
Hardman's dealer's plates on itA.

Yes, sir, had Hardman's.

Q. Just wait until I finish reading this, and tell
me whether you remember this: '-There
was no conversation between Hardman and
I about what we would do when we got back
to Hardman's place, but I feel sure he would
probably have typed up ''stickers'' and I
would have driven the International on home.
I had $500 cash at home that I would have
turned over to Hardman at the first opportunity along with the '41 Ford. He "\\as going
to give 1ne credit for $150 payable in about
90 days.' Do you recall that as being your
lHlderstanding you had with him'
A.

Yes, I do now.

Q.

So, the price you agreed on was $650 for this
vehicle?

A.

Yes, that's right."

The Barrus ~rotor, the seller of the pickup truck to
Hardn1an, deliverd to hiln a bill of sale and a rertificat~
of title but not the certificate of registration (92): none
of these doctunents was delivered to defendant Child
(93).
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Both Child and Hardrnan specifically testified the
tr.ansaction was to be cmnpleted when they returned to
Hardman's place of business at Sunset, Utah (80, 93).
As a matter of fact, Hardman had not intended to deliver
the papers until he had obtained the certificate of registration vrhich had not been produced by Barrus Motor
Company (99). He reaffirmed that all of these matters
were to be disposed of upon return to Sunset (99).
Hardman also picked up at the Barrus Motor Company a jeep which he attached to his wrecker truck for
return to Sunset ( 204). He and Child talked about the
return trip to Sunset and who was to drive each of the
trucks. Child testified (81) :

"Q.

Was there any conversation about who was
to drive the pickup?

A.

I was to drive the pickup and he was to drive
his wrecker truck.

Q.

Who was present at the time that was said?

A.

Well, nobody hut Mr. H.ardman and I, that I
can remember of.

Q. And who said it; did he say it or did you 1
A.

Well, he says, 'You drive the pickup and I'll
drive the other truck.'

Q. And the 'other truck,' did that have alsothat had a jeep attached to it that he was
taking up to Sunset?
A.

Yes, sir."

Also, there was discussion between these parties concerning the manner in which the truck was to be driven.
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Child testified in this regard as follows (81, 87):

...

"Q. And did he also say to you that he thought
that what you should do was to keep passing
each other so both of you would know that
each of you was all right, and your car was
all right?
A.

Yes, sir.
~Ir. Hardman, as
you left, or got ready to leave the Barrus
Motor Company, that you would drive the
pickup truck, or you would follow him home,
and he replied that, generally, one car would
pass the other car occasionally, so you would
both know that everything was okay?

Q. And do you recall telling

A.

Yes, sir.

• • • •
Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Hardman that
you would follow him in the pickup truck'
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And you recall him saying, in substance, that,
generally, on those trips, :~ou would pass each
other, so, if there was anything wrong with
either car, the other one would know about
itY
A.

Yes, sir."

As ,a 1natter of fact, the defendants drove in the
1nanner suggested hy Hard1nan (82). \Yhen they started
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from Tooele, Hardman was in the lead. At Handy Corner Hardman stopped and so did Child. Child passed'
Hardman and then Hardman passed Child. At the time
of the collision here involved, Child was making his
second pass as contemplated under the agreement behveen the two of them (82, 209, 210).
Another thing of importance is the fact that Hardman's dealers plates were placed on the truck for th8
return trip. Hardman towed a \Villys jeep with his
wrecker truck ( 204).
There can be no question concerning the fact that
Child was negligent in the manner in which he drove the
pick up truck. There was testimony to the effect that as
he passed the Hardman wrecker truck moving in an
easterly direction, there were at least three cars in the
immediate vicinity travelling in a westerly direction.
It was necessary for the first car to move off on the
shoulder of the road. The second car also moved off
and w.as hit a glancing blow by the pickup truck and the
"\Villiams automobile was the third and a head-on collision resulted.
On this appeal it is unnecessary to go into the details
of this evidence concerning the question of Child's negligence. The only substantial question concerns the liability of Hardman for the negligence of Child.
We will .answer the arguments of defendant Hardman in the order presented in his brief.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT CHILD WAS DRIVING THE PICKUP
TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION AS THE AGENT
OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR WHILE
ACTING PURSUANT TO A JOINT ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
SAID DEFENDANTS.
POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN OR IN REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

ARGr:JIEXT
POINT I
DEFENDANT CHILD WAS DRIVING THE PICKUP
TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION AS THE AGENT
OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR WHILE
ACTING PURSUANT TO A JOINT ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
SAID DEFENDANTS.

The burden of defendant Hardman's first point is
that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Hard1nan was responsible for Child's negligence.
He clain1s there was no evidence of a relationship of
1naster or servant, or principal.and agent between HardnJian and Child.
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony concerning this subject requires a finding that Hardman
was responsible for the 1nanner in which Child drove
the pickup truck on the occasion of the collision. The
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testimony on this subject is uncontradicted and we believe
the question is one of law to be determined by the court,
and Child's negligence should be imputed to Hardman.
There can be no question that the trip to and from
Tooele was made in the interests of the business of
Hardman as a used car salesman. It will not do to say
that this was .a trip in the interest of the buyer Child.
One 1night as well say that the operation of a department store is the business of the customers. True, the
customer gets some advantage, but from a legal standpoint the business is that of the seller. Hardman's business was conducted at Sunset, Utah, not Tooele, Utah.
From the evidence it is clear that both parties contemplated that the transaction was to be completed upon
their return to Sunset .and not before. It is an easy matter to determine the position Hardman would have taken
at Tooele if Child had said the car was his and he was on
his way to California with it. The business of selling
c.ars contemplates an eventual contract, contemplates
the transfer of title and the making out of the necessary
papers to effect those objects. We recognize that under
the Uniform Sales Act if everything has been performed
in connection with the sales contract except the payment
of the purchase price, ownership is presumed to pass.
We, however, do not have that situation in the case at
bar. There were a number of things yet to he done. In
the first instance, when Child was examined he did not
remember that the purchase price had been actually
agreed upon. He was shown a statement he had signed
and made to his attorney in which he had stated the price
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was to be $500 down and the balance of $150 payable in
about 90 days. In the sale of automobiles on credit,
written contracts are ordinarily executed by the parties.
The form or provisions of a written contract had not
been determined. While it appears from this statement
that the price of the pickup truck was to be $650 plus a
second hand car owned by Child, yet the time of payment
or the amount of interest to be paid had not been determined. Nothing was said about the insurance that was
to be carried either by Child or Hardman in connection
with this transaction. Apparently no determination had
been made as to whether or not a conditional sales contract would be the type of instrument which would be
executed to reflect the final terms of the sale. Nothing
had been determined as to the provisions of any such
contract to be made.
From these considerations it can be immediately seen
why it was that the parties did not believe the transaction was cOinplete, but that all matters relating to a
final disposition of the sale was to be determined after
the parties returned to Sunset, Utah. ~\nother thing
of importance is the fact that the pickup, at the time of
the collision, carried on it the dealer plates of Hardman
which, under the statute, indicated that the automobile
still belonged to Hardman (section 41-1-90, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953).
We sub1nit that under this testnnony, a finding is
required that defendant Hardman was the owner of the
pickup truck at the time of the collision.
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Under the statutes of the State of Utah no title had
passed. Section 41-1-72 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides as follows:
"Until the department shall have issued such
new certificate of registration and certificate of
ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be
registered shall be deemed not to have been made
and title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and s.aid intended transfer shall be deemed
to be incomplete and not to be valid or effective
for any purpose except as provided in section 411-77."
The latter section referred to provides as follows
(41-1-77):
"The owner of a motor vehicle who has made
a bona fide sale or transfer of his title or interest
and who has delivered possession of such vehicle
.and certificate of registration and the certificate
of title thereto properly endorsed to the purchaser
or transferee shall not be liable for any damages
thereafter resulting from negligent operation of
such vehicle by another."
None of the cases cited by defendant Hardman on
this subject of transfer of title or ownership, relate to a
situation similar to the one at b.ar. All of his cases are
ones which involve a situation between the parties to the
contract of sale or involve a question of estoppel.
For instance in Jones v. C. I. Trust, 64 Utah 151.,
228 Pac. 896 (1924), the basis of the decision was one of
estoppel. The plaintiff purchased an automobile from
the floor of an automobile sales company. The defendant
company financing the automobile sought to assert its
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security title. The court stated the defendant was estopped from asserting its title to the .automobile for the
reason that it had permitted the sales company to display this car for sale knowing that prospective purchasers might buy the same without any knowledge that
someone else held the title. Also, in the Jones case the
transaction between the sales company and plaintiff was
a cash transaction. The parties did not contemplate there
would be an extension of credit for any part of the purchase price. Under those circumstances no contract in
the future could be anticipated. An unconditional contract for sale of the automobile had been entered into
and title was held to pass upon the tender of the b.alance
of the purchase price. The parties intended that it would
be a cash transaction.
Da~·is v. Semloh Hotel, Inc., 86 rtah 318, -il P.2d 689,
is not in point because upon the discharge of the employee the employee imn1ediately becan1e liable for the
purchase price of the stock which w.as fixed by the contract. Here, again, the parties did not contemplate any
future execution of a contract or a detennina.tion of an
extension of tiine for payn1ent of price. It was to be a
cash transaction.

Jackson v. James, 97 Utal1 41, 89 P. ~d ~35, (1939)
was a case involving a gift. The Court held there
was ample evidence to support a finding that the autouwhilP had been delivered to the defendant. The Court
reviewed many of the sections relating to passage of
title and concluded as follows:
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"In the light of the whole chapter it is evident
that it.s provisions were written to protect innocent purchasers and third parties from fraud but
was not intended to be controlling as between the
parties to the trans.action. It may well be doubted
that the legislature could make mandatory any
such formalities as a prerequisite to transfer of
title as between the parties. It can of course prescribe such rules to be effective as to third parties
.and it may perhaps provide that the registered
title shall be an element in determining liability
for damages resulting from the operation of the
car, as indicated by Section 76."
From this quotation and particularly from the part
in italics it is clear that the Court w.as not speaking of a
case or a situation where the matter of liability for personal injuries was involved. The Court recognizes the
statutory requirements was material in cases where liability for damages was involved. In this chapter the
Legislature is speaking of ownership of a motor vehicle.
In these questions relating to responsibility for damages,
the question of ownership is of great importance in arriving at a conclusion as to who is liable for the injuries
and damages sustained in automobile collisions. Section
41-1-77, supra, conclusively establishes that in this type
of case ownership does not pass until the possession of
the motor vehide has been delivered and the certificate
of registration and the certificate of title properly
endorsed have also been delivered to the transferee.
Then, and then only, can a seller claim he is no longer
the owner of a car and relieved from liability for damages
from the negligent operation thereof. Unless this is the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
meaning to be given this statute there is no purpose for
its existence. We again submit that under the plain
wording of the Legislative enactments, the defendant
Hardman was still the owner of the pickup truck being
driven by defendant Child.
Utah cases support Plaintiff's position that title or
ownership had not passed to Child.
In Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Service ll!otor Co., 68 Utah
65, 249 P. 133 (1926) the action was apparently for
conversion and breach of contract. Plaintiff was a dealer
in Star motor cars and defeP-dant a dealer in Fords.
Jensen owned a used Ford. In negotiations between
Jensen and plaintiff it was agreed that plaintiff would
allow Jensen $175 for his Ford on a new Star the price
of which was $995. If plaintiff sold the Ford for
more than $175 then Jensen was to get credit for the
full amount received therefor. In a conversation between
Jensen and plaintiff's manager it was stated Jensen was
to pay the difference between the price of the Star and
the $175 or price received for the Ford whichever was
greater. Jensen stated it would crowd hun to pay cash
although he could pay most of the difference in cash.
The n1anager told hiin plaintiff could handle his note
and it could be settled at the tiiue the Star sedan was
delivered. The Ford was delivered to plaintiff, it found
a purrhaser and was holding it until three wooden wheels
could be installed. At this thue defendant, who had made
a trade with Jensen, obtained possession of the used Ford
The trial court held as a matter of law title had not
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passed to plaintiff. Thi.s was affirmed on appeal and
this court stated :

"It is no doubt true that, unless the minds
of Hyrum Jensen and the manager of appellant
had fully met respecting all of the essential terms
of the alleged contract for the sale of the Ford
sedan and the purchase of the Star sedan, the
alleged contract failed of consummation, and
hence appellant cannot recover damages for a
breach thereof, nor can it sustain an action of
trover for the value of the old Ford sedan. It
certainly is true that :
" 'In order that there may be an agreement,
the parties must have a distinct intention common
to both and without doubt or difference. Until
all understanding alike there can be no assent, and,
therefore, no contract. Both parties must assent
to the same thing in the same sense, and their
minds must meet as to all terms.': 13 C. J. 263,
Sec. 48.
"Further:
"'Where the parties have left an essential
part of the agreement for future determination,
it is no doubt correct to say that the contract is
not completed.' 6 R.C.L. p. 643, Sec. 59.
"It seems entirely unnecessary to multiply
authority upon a proposition so elementary as
the one here in question, and we shall refrain
from doing so. To the .mind of the writer it is
perfectly clear that no binding contract existed
between Hyrum ,Jensen and the appellant.

* * * * * * * * * *
"For example, the que.stion of how much of
the purchase price of the Star sedan Jensen should
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pay in cash, how much should be settled by the
execution of a note, and the length of time the
note should run, were all left for future determination. All of these constituted essential elements
and until fully agreed upon by both parties eithe~
one had the right to refuse the terms of payment
which might be proposed by the other; hence, the
contract was incomplete and unenforceable. Nor
does the fact that Jensen left the old Ford sedan
with appellant to be sold by it and the proceeds
of the sale accounted for to Jensen alter the legal
effect of the transaction. X or did it vest the title
of the car in appellant. Such was not the intention
of the parties and such was not the legal effect
of the transaction as it then stood."
"\Y e sub1nit that unCer the authority of this case
title or ownership of the pickup truck had not passed
from I-Iardman to Child.
In Stewart v. Commercial Ins. Co., 11± Utah 278,
198 P. 2d ±G7 (1948) this Court held Jackso!l Y. James,
supra, inapplicable and that in the absence of a completed agree1nent title would not pass.
In Sclw·artz v. TVlzite, 80 rtah 150, 13 P. 2d 6±3
(19:1:2) it was held that plaintiff acquired no title because he had not received the certificate of registration
required h~· Section 41-1-7:2. rtah Code Annotated, 1953.
See abo Traders Ocncra! l11s. Co .. Y. Pc:.cific Employees
l11s. Co., 130 Cal. ..:\ pp. :2d 158. :278 P. :2d 493.
In none of the ahoY(' cases was a situation presented
where the contest was lwtwet=-n the parties to the alleged
eontrad. ri 1 1H'Y all present situations where third parties
are involved just as in the case at bar.
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Plaintiff contends that as a matter of law, defendant Child was the servant, or .agent, of defendant Hardman, or at least they were engaged in a joint enterprise
in connection with returning the pickup truck to Sunset,
Utah.
The return of the pickup truck to Sunset was a part
of the business of Hardman. He was in the used car
business and a p.art of that business would contemplate
the completion of the sale and the receipt of the money
for the pickup truck. Hence, in the consummation of
this transaction connected with his business, it was
necessary that the car be returned to Sunset, Utah, to
accomplish the ultimate purpose of the transaction. As.
established .above, the ownership of the truck remained
in Hardman during this period of time. He was the one
who made the determination that Child should drive
the pickup truck. If he had asked one of the employees
of the Barrus ~rotor Company to drive this truck, certainly Child could have made no objection to it. That
employee of Barrus would then have become the employee of Hardman, for whose acts Hardman would have
been responsible. It was merely a fortuitous circumstance
that Child was present and available to conveniently
drive the pickup truck to the destination required hy
Hardman's business. True it is that Hardman was not
in the truck at the time of the collision, but he wns in
the immediate presence of the truck at all times and
through his suggestion was in a position to control the
driving of the truck. Before these parties left Tooele it
was his suggestion that they continue to pass each other.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
As a matter of fact it was in the very act of passing in
connection with this suggestion that this collision occurred. Under the cases, all that need be established is that
the alleged master or principal had the right to control.
IIere Hardman not only had the right to control the
manner of driving, but he in fact did partially control
the manner of driving.
In 60 C.J.S. 1086, Motor Vehicles, Section 436, the
rule is stated as follows:

"* * * Thus one driving the owner's car at
his request and for his purposes is the owners
servant, or agent."
See Cannon v. Dupree, (Tex.) 294 S.W. 298; Manint
v. Nugent (La.) 142 So. 201; Andres v. Cox, 223 :Mo.
App. 1139, 23 S.W. 2d 1066. In Winkelstein v. Solitare,
129 N.J.L. 38, 27 A. 2d 868, plaintiff was injured when
a passenger shut the door of the automobile at the request of the defendant owner. A directed verdict for
defendant was reversed.
In the Cannon case, supra, defendant owner asked
her brother to drive her automobile and then got in another car. Defendant was held responsible for the negligence of her brother. The blood relationship was not relied upon as bringing about this result. The court stated:
"When he was directed to assume, and was
intrusted with control of the .automobile a~ a
driver, he was, for all purposes, of a driver, her
representative or special servant in legal view;
and if careless, and injury resulted to occupant
of the car, the owner was liable to the san1e extent
.as if he were the regularly employed driver. The
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driving was an act incident to the service, and such
.special service was done by ~Ir. Taylor for the
benefit of the owner of the automobile *** As a
general rule, authority may be conferred by one
person upon another to do specially an act for him
without any agreement to compensate him and
without any binding undertaking on the part of
such latter person to execute the authority ( 2
C.J. 420)."
We agree with the quotations from Restatement of
the law of Agency, but subrnit that the evidence introduced in this case brings it within the principles laid down
in those quotations and establishes the existence of the
relationship between Hardman and Child.
The case of Oberhansley vs. Travelers Insurance
Company, 5 Utah 15, 295 P. 2d 1093 (1956) cited by
defendant is not in point. The issue to be detennined
was whether or not plaintiff was an employee in the
orthodox sense under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Plaintiff there had recovered a judgment against the
Pearce Auto :Mart for personal injuries sustained while
he was riding in a car driven by Lal\iar Pearce, the
president of that company. He was unable to collect the
judgment because of the insolvency of Pearce and his
Auto Mart. Plaintiff then brought an action upon a
liability policy is.sued by defendant to the Pearce Auto
~lart and it was in force at the time of the accident.
The defendant contended plaintiff was an employee of
the Auto l\iart and hence was under the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, in which event he
was explicitly excluded under the terms of the policy.
The Auto :Mart maintained Workmen's Compensation
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insurance, but plaintiff had never been reported as an
employee on any reports concerning employees. Parts
of the opinion would seem to indicate that plaintiff may
have been driving the car. The introductory remarks
in the opinion state explicitly that he was not, but was
merely a passenger in the car. Under all of the evidence
the trial court had made the finding that he \Yas not
an employee under the evidence produced. This Court
simply held the evidence supported that finding. Certainly this case does not support Hardman's contention
that he, .as a matter of law, was entitled to a directed verdict on the question of his responsibility. \Ye submit that
this case is not analogous to the case at bar, the granting
of a directed verdict was not involved.
D01csett vs. Dou·sett, 116 rtah 12, 207 P. 2d 809,
is another authority relied upon by defendant Hardman.
Defendant there was stationed at an army can1p in Texas
and telephoned his wife in Holladay, rtah, informing her
that he had obtained living quarters and wanted her
to come and stay with him and bring his car. Since
she could not drive the car and his n1other and father
could, he suggested she ask his 1nother and father to
drive the car and bring her along. This they consented
to do. The Dowsetts and a friend started on the trip.
The father drove and the nwther. ·who was plaintiff
in the case, sat in the front seat. The wife of defendant
and the friend sat in the back seat. The father. blinded
h~' the sun, drove the car off the road, injuring plaintiff.
The court grant('d a directed Yerdict on the ground that
plaintiff was a fellow serY.ant of the driYer and hence
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the driver's negligence was also her negligence and therefore she could not recover. On appeal, plaintiff contended
they were not fellow servants and there was no contract
of employment between defendant and plaintiff and the
driver. Plaintiff contended the relationship was consensual and not based on contract and defendant had
no right to control the driver of the car as to how the
car wa.s to be driven or as to what route was to be taken.
Defendant conceded there w.as no right of control. Under:
these contentions it was admitted by the parties there was
no right of control and hence a directed verdict would
necessarily follow. Thi.s result is directly attributable to
the contentions made by the respective parties. Also, in
the Dowsett case, there was no question that the partie~
were in the transaction of any business of any one of
them. In the case at bar the parties were in the process
of completing a transaction within the confines of the
automobile sales business conducted by defendant Hardman.
Defendant Hardman .also seeks to bring this case
within the rule of a prospective purchaser as exemplified by the annotation 31 A.L.R. 2d 1445. That rule is
stated as follows at page 1450 of the annotation
"An automobile dealer is not liable for injuries or damage resulting from negligence in the
operation of the dealer's car by a prospective
purchaser who is seeking to determine whether
he will purchase such a car from the dealer."
'rhere is no evidence in this case that Child was
testing or trying out the car to determine whether he
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would purchase it. 'The evidence without dispute shows
he was driving the car to Sunset as part and parcel of
defendant Hardman's used car business. There the transaction was to be completed.
Under the evidence we submit it is clear that Child
was driving Hardman's truck at his request and for his
purposes. But if the view is taken that Child had an
interest in returning the car to Sunset to complete the
transaction then the least that can be said is that they
were engaged in a joint enterprise in that each }l...ad a
joint right of control.
At the time they were in the process of completing.
a sale and purchase of the truck involved, they were
both interested in getting it to Sunset, to Hardman's
place of business.
As stated in Fox vs. Lavender, 89 Ut. 115, 56 P.,
2d 1049, the nature of the thing to be accomplished
makes the trip itself a part of that purpose.
At page 23 of his brief Hardn1an puts plaintiff's
case inaccurately. He states the basis of plaintiff's contention in this regard is that the parties had a common
destination. Hardn1an was the owner of the truck. As
shown above this trip and the driving of the truck was
part and parcel of the negotiations which were taking
place behYeen the parties. The contract was to be completely fonned after arrival at Sunset. Hence the necessity of the trip.
II.ardn1an not only had a right of control but he
exPrcised it in telling Child to drive the truck and that
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they should pass each other. This course of conduct
was followed on the trip. By this method the truck was
kept in a position where Hardman could observe the
course it took and the way it was driven. While Hardman
was not physically present in the truck he nevertheless
w.as in the immediate vicinity of the truck and could
have stopped it at any time. As a matter of fact on
the occasion when Hardman stopped, Child also stopped.
Hardman in his brief assumes that defendant would
also have to claim Child would be responsible for any
negligence of Hardn1an in driving the wrecker truck.
This shows a misconception of plaintiff's contention. The
only truck which both had an interest in getting to Sunset was the pickup truck driven by Child. That was the
only truck involved in the proposed sale. Hence that
was the only truck in the joint enterprise. That Hardman
w.as driving another truck for his own purposes was
not a part of the joint undertaking. Getting the truckto Sunset was the joint enterprise not getting Hardman
there.
Hardman lays great stress on the fact that there
was no participation by him in the expenses of the
trip. If the truck was his, the gas was his and was being
used. Child contributed his time and effort.

vVe

respectfully submit that Hardn1an was respon-r
sible as a matter of law for the negligence of Child and
certainly I-Iardman was not entitled to a directed verdict
on that subject.
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POINT II
THE COURT COMMIT'TED NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN OR IN REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

Defendant Hardman under this point in his brief
has set forth various instructions given by the trial court,
and instructions requested by him which were refused,
daiming the trial court committed prejudicial error in.
connection therewith. 'Ve will take each of these contentions made by defendant Hardman in the order in
which he has presented them in his brief and answer the
criticism which he levels against the court's instructions
and the refusal to grant his requests.

TRIAL COrRT'S IXSTRVCTIOX N"O. 19
Defendant Hardman contends the trial court erred
in giving subdivision (a) and (b) of Instruction Xo. 19.
If plaintiff is correct in his contentions under Point
I then no error \Yas conunitted in giving these subdivisions for the reason that ownership and responsibility
of H.ardman should have been detennined as a 1natter
of law by the trial court against defendant Ha.rd1nan
and so the jury could haYe found only in favor of plaintiff on the.se issues.
'Ve also subn1it it was proper for the trial court
to use the ~i1nple tenu "owner" and let the jury 1nake
its detennination on that instruction. In a11y eYent if
defendant I-Iardnlan desired a 1nore explicit and enlarged
definition of owner and ownership it was incuinba.nt
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upon him to make a proper request embodying the desired
elements. As will hereafter appear this he did not do.
Defendant Hardman does not contend this instruction
was an incorrect statement of law but merely that there
should be more of it.
Subdivision (b) was also a correct statement of
the law and an adequate statement of the controlling
principles of law. If the jury found that Child was driving
the truck as the agent and employee of and on behalf
of and for the benefit of Hardman .and not on his own
behalf or for a purpose of his own, it must follow that
Hardman had the right to control Child in his manner
of driving. This same instruction was given and approved
in ~11 aberto vs. Wolfe, 106 Cal. App. 202, 289 P. 218
.at 220.
Certainly the evidence discussed under Point I would
at least justify submission of these issues to the jury.
HARD~fAN'S

REQuESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6

(A)
Defendant I-Iardman concedes that this requested
instruction does not correctly follow the evidence introduced, (Appellant's Brief, page 32). There was no testimony in the case that the entire purchase price was to.
be paid upon the return to Sunset by the delivery of
an old c.ar for a credit of $100.00 and the payment of
$500.00 in cash or otherwise. This portion of the instruction assumes there was to be a cash or completed transaction when the only testimony introduced contemplated
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an extension of credit in connection with the purchase
of this truck.
At first Child testified the price had been partly
agreed upon but he did not remember that it had actually
been agreed upon (80). Then on cross examination by
his co-defendant's counsel Child was read a statement
he had made to his own attorney to the effect that he
had $500 cash at home he would have turned over to
Hardman along with a 1941 Ford, and that Hardman
was going to give him credit for $150 payable in about
90 days (86). Child then testified he remembered the
statement and the price agreed upon was $650.00 (87).
Even this testimony to a leading question was inaccurate
because there was also involved the delivery of a Ford
car.
This discrepancy alone justified refusal of this instruction. The penciled notations on the original request
(33) establish that this was at least one of the reasons
the trial court refused the instruction. He has placed
a question mark just to the right of the inaccurate statement. At the end of the instruction he has placed the
words "not factually right."
This request has the further fault that it does not
correctly state the law. Disregarding for the moment
the Statutes on passage of title and ownership found
in the 1\fotor \ 'ehicle Code, title passes when the parties:
intend that it should. This request states that unless
a different intention appears title passes when the contract of purchase is made. Under section 60-2-3, Utah
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Code Annotated, 1953, this is not true unless there is an
'Ltnconditional contract of purchase. The evidence established there was not such a contract. The parties contemplated completing the transaction or deal when they
returned to Sunset (80, 93). The contract had not been
completed. No written contract had been made or agreed
upon. No time had been fixed for extension of credit.
The form of the contract whether conditional sale or
otherwise had not been determined. Subjects such as
interest and insurance had not been fL"'Ced. These are
Inatters universally and necessarily involved in tr.ans-,
actions of this kind where credit is extended. This was
not a cash transaction.
After the first sentence the request abandons any
need for the jury to find the intention of the parties.
This last portion of the request would have informed the
jury that if it found Child after an inspection of the
truck expressed satisfaction with it, said he would buy
it for $650.00 and Hardman paid Barrus for the truck
and delivered it to Child, then Child and not Hardman
would be the owner. This would not conclusively establish
an intention by both parties that title should p.ass in
view of the testimony by both that the deal was not
to be completed until the return to Sunset and in view
of the further fact this was not to be a ca.sh transaction
but would involve an extension of credit with the various
terms which would have to be .agreed upon before there
would come into existence an unconditional or completed
contract of sale.
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When the requirements of sections 41-1-71 and 77
are considered the requested instruction is obviously an
inc·orrect statement. Also the use of Hardman's plates
was at least evidence that the parties intended that
l Tardman should remain the owner until Sunset was
reached.
HARD:\[AX'S REQL"ESTED IXSTRrCTIOXS
XL"~IBERS

6 and 6(C)

These requests express various notions on \Yhat
should be found to impute Child's negligence to Hardman. On each instruction the trial court noted that the
matter "·as given in another wa:·, or in another instruction, (31, 35). \Ye submit the matter herein requested
was adequately covered by Instruction Xo. 19 subdinsion(b).
Here again, under Point I. no error was committed
because defendant Hardn1an would be responsible as
a matter of law for Child's negligence.
IIARD:\IAX'S REQUESTED IXSTRUCTIOX
NO. 6 (B)

This has the san1e inaccuracies as noted in Hardman's Reque~t No.6 (A), supra. It presupposes evidence
that Child was to pay the purchase price on .arrh·al
at Sunset. This was not to be a cash transaction. This
n'qnPst also inaccurate}~· states the la"· for tl1e reason
that the jury under this request is not required to consi<lPr tlw intention of thr p.arties on the question of when
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title passed. The same arguments made concerning Hardman's requested Instruction No. 6 (A) are applicable
here.
HARD11AN'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO.7 (A)
By this instruction defendant Hardman sought to
raise an issue covering the situation where a prospective
purchaser is driving .an automobile. As indicated by
the trial court in his notation on the original request
(36) "Not given-outside issues and evidence." Defendant
Hardman's contention was that Child was driving his
own car for his own purposes. Plaintiff's position was
that Child was driving Hardman's truck in furtherance
of Hardman's business.
The rule Hardman here sought to make applicable
relates to a situation where the prospective purchaser
is trying out or testing the car and exemplified by the
annotation 31 A.L.R. 2d 1445 and there is no evidence
making this rule applicable.
\Ye submit Instruction No. 19 adequately covered
the contentions of the parties. Point I herein also establishes there was no error in this refusal.
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 23
The complained of portion of this instruction on
damages permitted the jury to take into consideration
mental .and physical pain and suffering which plaintiff
might probably endure in the future.
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Plaintiff suffered mutiple bruises and abrasions all
over his body (167), fractured ribs from the third to
the sixth on the left side (168) and which punctured
his lung (169), a he1natoma from his hip to his knee
on the left leg (170) and a hematoma on his right shin.
(171).
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. ::\!arion B. Noyes,
his attending physician, just two days before the trial.
At that time he found plaintiff still had some soreness
in the left rib cage and in the left side. In the doctor's
opinion, plaintiff "may have some residual soreness like
any person will after a fractured or injured area" (112).
He testified (173):
"Well, I don't expect it to last too long. I
don't think there is any injury there that is going
to be disabling from that standpoint, except residual soreness; some aching occasionally. Smnetimes
it varies with the weather and one thing and another, what they do. Any fracture does."

.........

~

"He may have occasional aching and paining
intermittentlY from tilne to time over the original
injuries, but· it is pretty hard for any person to
prophesy on that."
Plaintiff in describing his present condition, described the mental effects fr01n whieh he was suffering
at the time of trial. He also testified his hip and chest
still bothered hin1 (187, 188).
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From this evidence the jury could find that he would
suffer some mental and physical pain in the future and
should be able to take this into consideration in assessing
damages. This condition would certainly not stop on
the day of trial but would continue for some time in
the future and the jury should he entitled to take this
into consideration in determining the amount of damages
to which plaintiff was entitled.
On the matter of loss of bodily function, it should
be observed that the trial court eliminated from plaintiff's request No. 8 ( 23) consideration of loss of bodily
function in assessing damages. Just who would tamper
with the court's instructions is not disclosed. Certainly the
trial judge, after eliminating this paragraph from plaintiff's request, would have eliminated any reference to
this subject in the instructions given and he did this
by placing an ink line through the portion of the instruction which mentioned bodily function. The record does
not sustain defendant's assertion.
Instruction No. 21 (B) (.apparently defendant Hardman's Request No. 9, see R. 58, the Court adding the
word "permanent'') instructed the jury there was no
evidence of permanent loss of bodily function, or permanent disability. There was no error here.
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 14
By thi.s instruction the jury was informed that if
Child drove the truck when he knew, or in the exercise of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
reasonable care should have known, there was some defect in the tire or tube which made driving on the highway dangerous to others, then he was negligent and if
such negligence proximately caused injuries to plaintiff then a verdict should be returned for plaintiff and
against Child (49).
Defendant Hardman in his cross-complaint against
the Barrus Motor Company .alleged that company \Yas
negligent in equipping the truck with a right rear tire
and tube which it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known was defective and likely to fail
and which caused Child to lose control of the truck (11).
Defendant Hardman introduced testimony through his
expert Robert

~I.

Bletzacher, that the tire and tube were

defective and had been for several miles before the
collision ( 226-230).
Louise Boyer, a witness called by plaintiff, testified
that she was driving an autmnobile in the same direction
as Child and in1n1ediately behind hun for son1e distance
( 14J). As Child drove. his truck kept swerving to the

right side of the road and on to the gr.avel shoulder (1±3).
If the right rear tire were running low it would tend to
pull truck in that direction ..A

jur~-

could find this indi-

cated smnething was wrong with the tire or tube and
<·ertainly ~hould havt' given notice to Child that something wa~ \\Tong wPil before the collision occurred. The
giving of this instruction is supported by the e·ddence.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant Hardman was conducting his used car
business in effecting a s.ale, partially on credit, of a
truck to defendant Child. He requested Child to drive
the truck to Sunset, Utah, where the deal was to be
completed. He suggested the manner of travel. We submit that under these circumstances defendant Hardman
is responsible as a matter of law for any negligence of
defendant Child.
In any event, the entire matter was submitted to
the jury under proper instructions and it found for
plaintiff.
We submit the judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
By Brigham E. Roberts
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
By Leonard W. Elton

Counsel for Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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